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ABSTRACT Deliberative democracy has become fashionable for many and it has been used in some 
places to solve real-world policy problems. However measuring the ‘success’ of deliberative democracy 
is not clearly achievable. For most ‘success’ is measured in terms of opinion change, but these are only 
rarely measured against control groups, and in particular there is no way of knowing if the opinion 
change took place because of the deliberation or because of information they received through the 
deliberation process. Exercises in deliberation seem to represent one big treatment. But we would want 
to separate out the component parts of the treatment. This paper outlines the results of an experiment 
in which deliberation took place in a pilot Citizens’ Assembly in Ireland. As part of this we measured the 
impact using pre and post-test controls, including a control group given the information the CA 
participants received, but without the deliberation. The results of the experiment reveal that there is a 
deliberation effect separate to the information effect. 
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Introduction: deliberation and opinion change 
When people form or change opinions they are widely thought to do so on the basis 
of information and predispositions, and the interaction of the two (Zaller 1992). Other 
people‟s opinions could matter but only insofar as they introduce new information or 
perhaps if their superior cognitive capacity enables information to become 
meaningful. However there is little empirical support for the model of atomised 
humans weighting new pieces of information in order to update their opinions.  
When we think about how public opinion is formed it is not as the result of people 
individually and rationally evaluating a problem, weighing the pros and cons of 
different proposals, and establishing their preferred position. Ordinary people 
deliberate all the time – at the kitchen table, in the pub, at work – about public 
issues. When new information is given to us, many of us will deal with it in different 
ways, but often it is in how others react to the information that it becomes important. 
Information or events are interpreted for us and certain interpretations or „spin‟ take 
over. Therefore opinion formation, rather than being an individualistic exercise, is 
more likely the conscious and subconscious collective behaviour of society as a 
result of deliberation.  
Some theories of public opinion formation (for instance the Spiral of Silence) support 
the idea that people‟s interactions are important. These are directly concerned with 
how people perceive others‟ opinions and how those opinions affect their own 
opinions. In this way opinion formation is dynamic and people‟s exchanges of views 
are as important as exchanges of information. The act of deliberation with others 
then should be at least as important as any new information when forming opinions 
or choosing, say, how to vote on a particular issue. 
Testing how people form opinions in a dynamic setting is difficult, although the field 
has made some progress recently with advances in communication and social 
network analysis (Huckfeldt 2007). These allow us look at connections but often not 
the nature of the contact between these connected individuals. Other forms of 
studying opinion change, even panel studies, do not allow the investigator to look at 
exactly what elements might cause opinion change. We use an experiment in 
deliberative democracy to see if we can better understand the impact of information 
and deliberative contact between individuals on opinion formation and change. 
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Deliberation is regarded as important for democratic decision making, with many 
scholars arguing that decisions made after deliberation are „better‟. Deliberative 
democracy is then for many a normative ideal but possibly also an empirically 
testable theory. But even for those for whom it is a normative ideal, this is based on 
some assumptions of what deliberation does. If we find that deliberation does or 
does not in fact achieve these goals support for deliberative democracy as a way to 
make decisions might change. 
On the face of it, there is little anyone could argue against deliberation. Most 
contemporary political theorists argue that where decision-makers deliberate they 
are likely to make better decisions because they subject proposals to much greater 
scrutiny. Where decision makers deliberate they reveal their positions to one another 
and they should through collective discussion pool their information and thus 
increase the informational level for each member. This is thought to enrich the 
quality of democracy. This assumes certain things about the participants, not least 
that they are reasonable, and that they have sufficient knowledge and capacity to 
deliberate. These assumptions are not usually a problem in representative 
democracy, where those elected by their peers to deliberate and decide on the 
public‟s behalf are likely to be the elite in society. But whether ordinary citizens are, 
or even need to be, well-informed is a matter of some debate (Lupia and McCubbins 
1998).  
The central claim of deliberative democratic theorists that deliberation leads us to 
make better decisions is a bold one, but also one that is difficult to test as whether 
one decision is better than another is essentially subjective. Looking at opinion or 
preference change is less so. Deliberative theorists also expect to see that there will 
be a greater degree of change as a result of good deliberation (itself a subject of 
some controversy). One problem for those interested in testing the impact of 
deliberation on people is that we do not know exactly what parts of it are important. 
Empirical studies rarely distinguish between deliberation and information; For 
instance, Fishkin et al. (2000: 660) find that „after a weekend of information and 
discussion….changes in opinion have often been substantial‟.  
This short quote encapsulates two problems with deliberative democracy as a 
theory. One is the problem of causal inference. As Mutz notes a „difficulty with 
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drawing causal inference about the power of deliberation from deliberative polling is 
that several independent variables are manipulated at the same time‟ (Mutz 2006: 
59). A second problem is the way deliberative theorists often regard opinion change 
as evidence that deliberation works. Of course change might be in the wrong 
direction; they could move in the direction of making a worse decision. 
In this paper we report the results of an exercise in deliberation that took place in 
Ireland in 2011. As part of this we explore the results of a quasi-experiment in which 
we separate out the effect of information from the impact of deliberation on opinion 
change. As such we regard this research as having a contribution to make in two 
distinct literatures, that on opinion formation and that on deliberative democracy. We 
subjected different groups to different treatments, one group received just 
information, whereas the other received both information and the opportunity to 
deliberate with other randomly selected citizens. We found that opinion change was 
much more substantial among the group who had the information and deliberated, 
whereas those with just the information changed very little. This suggests that how 
people interact with others and discuss political issues is more important in people‟s 
opinion formation than merely the information they receive.  
The paper sets out the arguments for the effects of deliberation generally, and then 
more specifically at the literature on information and deliberation. We then set out 
how we seek to test our argument that deliberation is important. This describes in 
detail the operation of an exercise in deliberation. We then provide the results and 
conclude with a discussion of their implications. 
 
Deliberation and its effects on opinion 
When we think now about deliberative democracy, we often now associate it with 
mini-publics – ordinary people deliberating on some issue of public importance. But 
there is no reason why it should be restricted to ordinary people and Steiner et al. 
(2005) have shown how we can study deliberation in elites. The democratic aspect 
to deliberative democracy implies that it should be undertaken in order to make a 
decision.  We can think of a number of types of ways of making decisions by groups 
of people. Elster (1998: 5) names them as arguing, bargaining, and preference 
aggregation, where arguing is deliberation in which there is an exchange of views 
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and an exchange of information. Participants seek to convince others of the 
rightness of their opinions. Decision-making through bargaining sees the power of 
each actor comes to the fore. Preference aggregation is decision-making as the 
result of a vote. In real-world politics all three of these decision making forms are 
used. 
And so deliberative democracy is far more common that we usually assume. 
Parliaments and cabinets, we hope, engage in deliberation all the time. Policy 
making without argument seems ridiculous – but there might be questions as to 
whether the positions put in argument are sincere or strategic. Then is the 
deliberation genuine in the sense that the participants‟ minds can be changed, or is 
modern politics so well-scripted that no real debate takes place? The sincerity and 
genuineness of the deliberation is often questioned in elite politics. Many actors have 
incentives not to be sincere. Professional politicians seek re-election above most 
other goals, experts have interests in certain outcomes, lobbyists have financial 
interests, media may have an agenda that could make these actors not best placed 
to make decisions for the common good. The public seem not to trust politicians to 
make decisions for them at times. An illustration of this is the recent rejection of a 
proposal to empower the Irish parliament to conduct public inquiries; though most 
voters claimed to have wanted a stronger parliament, many did not trust their elected 
representatives with strong powers of inquiry and the proposal was rejected (see 
Marsh, Suiter, and Reidy 2012). 
It is thought that ordinary citizens affected by a decision, while they might have 
interests are much less likely to game a discussion and decision, and so for that 
reason we are now much more likely to think of deliberative democracy as a mini-
public forum. It is thought to be good because people are more equal in such forums. 
Depending on the nature of the deliberation, people might be more public motivated 
rather than interest motivated. So we would expect to see that the discourse 
becomes public-spirited, more co-operative, more accommodating, more 
constructive and that within the small group involved there is a broader involvement 
in discussion than normally happens in society. Whether ordinary people are more 
likely to be earnest and non-strategic in their deliberation and decision making is an 
empirical question. One might reasonably say that a problem with involving ordinary 
people is that they may have incoherent, ignorant, biased, factually incorrect, partial 
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or inconsistent opinions. Supporters of deliberation argue that these problems, if they 
exist, might be alleviated by deliberation. These and many other claims for what 
deliberation does that can be tested empirically. 
We might also expect that there is greater trust in decision, the decision making 
system and that decisions made in such a way have greater legitimacy. For Fishkin 
(2009: 103-5) there is an expectation that there will be changes in policy attitudes 
and/ or vote intentions. There are many reviews of the theoretical literature on 
deliberation, and one list of the empirical expectations of the theory (Delli Carpini, 
Lomax Cook, and Jacobs 2004: 320) sets out the following: 
1. More engaged and active citizens 
2. More tolerant citizens, who appreciate the value of other points of view 
3. Citizens will be better able to understand and argue for their own preferences 
4. Less adversarial approach to political debates 
5. More faith in the democratic process 
6. Decisions will be more considered 
7. Decisions might be more consensual 
 
Chambers (2003: 318) argues „a central tenet of all deliberative theory is that 
deliberation can change minds and transform opinions…. [M]any believe that 
deliberation under the right conditions will have a tendency to broaden perspectives, 
[and] promote tolerance and understanding between groups.‟ This idea that minds 
are changed, we have seen is of critical importance to many advocates of 
deliberative democracy. But how it changes minds and opinions is not as clear. 
 
Deliberation and information 
One of the most useful ways of thinking how deliberation of mini-publics works in 
practice is that of the jury system. Juries take (semi) randomly selected groups and 
ask them to make a binding decision that has consequences for the rest of society. It 
is also interesting in how juries treat information. Juries are disbarred from 
deliberating until all the evidence (information) has been given them. Therefore the 
information and deliberation are somewhat separate. In order to measure the impact 
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of deliberation as compared to that of information we might want to measure the 
opinions of jurors after the evidence has been presented and then before 
deliberation and then after deliberation in the jury room. Of course this may not 
perfectly measure the impact of deliberation as there is some incentive for jurors to 
vote strategically in the jury room – they might vote with the majority view in order to 
be allowed go home.  
But despite Mutz‟s (2006: 59) reasonable plea to separate out the treatments in 
deliberative democracy, deliberation and information cannot be separated out 
completely. It is difficult to conceive of the deliberation in the jury room being of use 
without the evidence. For Fishkin (1995: 41) the quality of the discussion and 
information are linked, as he argues, „when information that would be required 
understand the force of claim is absent, inter alia, then the process is less 
deliberative‟. 
And deliberation might also provoke new information. Skyrms‟ (1990) idea of 
dynamic deliberation sums up the issue of deliberation and information. Deliberation 
will often generate new information which then feeds back into the deliberative 
process. Information on its own, without deliberation will not have this dynamic 
effect. So we should expect that deliberation will generate more change than where 
information alone is available.  
But the nature of the impact of information and deliberation is not clear from the 
empirical literature. Gaertner et al. (1999) found that while discussion increased 
consensus, this may have been the result of a simple exchange of information. Other 
research suggests that this simple exchange of information may not even occur. 
Experimental research on candidate evaluations by Stasser and Titus (1985) found 
that participants failed to share information where deliberative theorists might have 
expected. Goodin and Niemeyer (2003) report the results of a citizens‟ jury in which 
they found that the information phase was most important. They re-questioned each 
of the 12 jury members between receiving evidence and staring the public 
discussion. This, they argue, shows that deliberation starts with the consideration of 
new information, even in people‟s heads.  
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So does the deliberation matter or is it that the participants are more interested (by 
virtue of a level of self-selection), more exposed to information, the framing of the 
questions, or the choice of experts? 
 
The test 
There are some concerns as to whether deliberative democracy theory is empirically 
testable (see Mutz 2008). Many normative theorists when confronted with evidence 
that exercises in deliberative democracy do not produce the results expected by 
them can simply retort that then the exercise must not have been conducted 
properly, it was somehow not „deliberative‟ enough, arguably rendering the theory 
unfalsifiable. 
But there are also problems with the way some empirical testing is carried out. Most 
specifically what concerns us here is the way in which deliberation is „one grand 
treatment‟  (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002) where no attempt is made to separate 
out information, deliberation, or treatment effects. Deliberative polling carried out and 
reported by Fishkin (2009) include no control groups or even tests for statistical 
significance. Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2011) argue that an experimental approach 
to citizen deliberation will be of most use for answering questions n the relative 
impact of treatments in deliberative democracy. 
We can find few examples of where the treatments are separated out adequately.  
Price and Capella (2005, 2007) do so for an online discussion forum, which finds that 
exposure to information cannot explain all aspects of opinion change. But this 
research had no control groups. In Denmark on the question of Euro membership 
Andersen and Hansen (2007) found that change was greater in the time between the 
recruitment interview and the one after receiving the briefing materials three weeks 
later, than that change between the interviews just before and after the deliberative 
weekend. There were some problems with this research not least the impact of 
different modes of delivering the questionnaires and the absence of control groups. 
In our test we attempt to separate out some of the treatments by using a quasi-
experimental design (see Figure 1) in which the information given to those involved 
in the deliberation is also given to another treatment group who just receive that 
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information and a further control group who receive no treatment beyond the two 
interviews. Exercises in deliberation are often criticised for their non-natural settings. 
This is hardly how people deliberate in everyday life. There are of course two 
elements to deliberative democracy. The deliberative aspect has been discussed, 
but there is also a democratic aspect. In a democracy there is an assumption that a 
group comes to a single decision binding on others within the group. Ours is also a 
non-natural setting; But we think that it has some external validity for deliberation in 
natural settings and can tell us something about the impact of information and 
deliberation. The WtC exercise was not decision-oriented; we did not require groups 
to agree a decision. So this possibly tells us more about opinion change and 
deliberation more generally.  
Figure 1: recruitment and surveys  
 
We the Citizens (WtC) was a pilot of a constitutional convention to demonstrate how 
such a convention might operate and learn about how to operate one properly. We 
the Citizens started with a fully randomised national survey carried out by phone 
using random digit dialling of 1200 people (for a full description of this see Farrell, 
Suiter & O‟Malley 2012). Having completed the survey these were asked if they 
would be interested in taking part in a weekend of deliberation on some of the topics. 
45 percent of people initially indicated an interest, but this dropped to below 30 
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percent when a specific weekend was mentioned. Of the 30 percent (360 people) we 
invited 160 people to take part in the WtC weekend. Of these invitees, most 
accepted and turned up, although some indicated that they now could not make it or 
did not show up. In total 100 turned up and took part in the weekend although two 
left before it had finished. Figure 2 shows that this group was broadly representative 
of the Irish population in terms of key demographic characteristics. In other terms, 
such as interest in politics the group, being partially self-selected (hence ours being 
a quasi-experiment rather than a fully randomised experiment), the WtC group had 
more interest in politics than the rest of the population, but their opinions on the 
substantive issues did not differ markedly. 
Figure 2: Demographic characteristics of WtC group and population 
 
The 160 invitees were given informational materials in advance of the meeting on all 
aspects of the discussions that were to take place. The agenda for the CA was 
determined by the survey responses, resulting in all of Saturday being devoted to 
political reform-related issues and Sunday morning to taxation vs. spending. Expert 
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witnesses were recruited to draft brief position papers, setting out both sides of the 
argument in question.  These papers were circulated to the CA members in advance.   
The CA weekend was organized into three discrete sessions as follows: 
 Saturday morning: TDs (MPs) and their role (discussions about TDs and 
constituency work, electoral reform and its impact on TDs roles, and the size 
of the Dáil (parliament)); 
 Saturday afternoon: Who are our politicians (should parties field more women 
candidates; should there be term limits; should there be external experts in 
government); 
 Sunday morning: In dealing with the economic crisis, should we focus more 
on tax rises or spending cuts? 
 
The 100 CA members were distributed around the hall in tables of eight, with a 
trained facilitator and note-taker at each table. At the start of each session the expert 
witness (one for each of the Saturday sessions, two for the Sunday session) gave a 
brief presentation summarizing their main points. There then followed an initial 
period of deliberation at each table, with the experts on hand to provide answers of 
fact or detail as required. Once these discussions concluded there was a brief round 
of plenary discussion, the objective being to give CA members an opportunity to hear 
about the tenor of discussions generally.  The tables were then asked to complete 
another round of deliberations at the end of which they could make a series of 
recommendations.   
Another group of 250 (see Figure 1) who had indicated an interest in the deliberative 
weekend, but had indicated that for practical reasons they could not commit to taking 
part agreed to receive some informational materials about some of the questions that 
were being discussed at the weekend. 101 of these were then reinterviewed. The 
information they received related to just one of the sessions, on a separate topic to 
the other two sessions during the deliberative weekend. This was so as not to 
overload them with information making them less likely to read and respond in the 
next survey. It also ensured that we were comparing like-with-like, as the other 
session would have been so closely connected that one‟s presence in the linked 
session may have contaminated the session under investigation. The materials the 
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information-only group received on this topic were the same as those received by the 
deliberative treatment group. There is of course the possibility that those who 
received only the information did not read the materials. However given their 
willingness to agree to receive them and then be reinterviewed after having received 
them we consider it likely that those who responded did read the information we sent 
them. 
Two further control groups were also interviewed. One group of 400 was interviewed 
twice, but with no treatment and a second group of 500 was just interviewed after the 
deliberative weekend. This latter group we do not use here, but an analysis of it 
compared to the first set of interviews shows that there was no other event which 
might have caused a large shift in opinion between the first and second interviews. 
All interviews took place by phone using random-digit dialling in the first instance 
where certain quotas related to gender, age and region were to be met. The 
interviewing was carried out by tnsMRBI a well-established market research 
company in Ireland. 
 
The results 
In this experiment we expect to see that deliberation is a more important determinant 
of opinion change than information. This would be consistent with many theories of 
opinion change which emphasise the impact of other people‟s opinions in forming 
one‟s own. We also see that there is an expectation that deliberation will generate 
more information, and so again should be more powerful. The paper also speaks to 
the literature on deliberative democracy and whether deliberation works. One of the 
central aspects of deliberation is that it might cause opinion change. But we have 
seen deliberative democratic theorists also have expectations on participants‟ 
efficacy and interest in politics. There are other expectations that deliberation should 
lead to more tolerance and more consensus-oriented in groups. The WtC experiment 
allowed us to test these claims empirically. 
Efficacy & Interest: For interest in politics the group that chose to go on the 
deliberative weekend, unsurprisingly was much more interested in politics than the 
other groups (mean 5.2 on a 1-7 scale, n=97). Those who expressed an interest in 
attending but said they could not attend had initially more interest (4.65, n=101) than 
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the control group (4.2, n=353). After the treatments of information and deliberation, 
the information-only group‟s interest in politics fell to 4.5, though the drop is not 
statistically significant and the control group remained the same. The interest in 
politics for the group that received both information and deliberation treatments rose 
to 5.7 (one tailed t-test, p=0.0017) as deliberative theorists would expect to see. 
People‟s enjoyment of discussing political issues sees similar results. The 
information and deliberation treatment group increase their self-declared enjoyment 
of discussing politics with others (5.2 to 5.64, p=0.005), whereas the information only 
group see a fall in their interest (4.7 to 4.48, p=0.06). Here the control group report a 
rise in this measure (4.16 to 4.32, p=0.04). On a subjective knowledge question (“I 
think I am better informed about politics and government than most people”) there is 
no significant movement for any of the groups. On a subjective political efficacy 
question the deliberative treatment group starts with a lower subjective efficacy than 
the other groups but moves significantly in the direction we expect 4.43 to 4.01, 
p=0.048), whereas neither other group moves significantly. The final question on 
interest in political issues, asked respondents their willingness to get more involved 
in political issues than they currently are. Perhaps unsurprisingly the group that 
volunteered for the deliberative weekend started off more willing 4.53 (compared to 
3.90 and 3.10 for the information only and control groups) and became much more 
willing (5.74, p>0.0001) whereas there was just random movement in the other 
groups. 
Opinion Change: On the questions of efficacy and attitudes to politics we would not 
expect that the information treatment would be very different from the control group. 
However in those areas that the information was directly pertinent, this should 
provide a more robust test of whether deliberation or information is more important in 
opinion formation and change. The information received by each participant in the 
deliberative weekend and by the group of 101 people who received the information 
and were reinterviewed, related to the economy and in particular how Ireland should 
close its budget deficit. On these issues the deliberative treatment group‟s members 
were not much different to the other groups. For instance 58 percent of the 
deliberative treatment group were opposed to the introduction of a property tax 
compared to 53 and 59 percent in the other groups. This fell to 40 percent for the 
deliberative group (p=0.0007) whereas the other two groups saw no significant 
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change. The number in favour of introducing water charges went from 62 percent to 
almost 85 percent (p<0.0001). It rose slightly among the control group 49 percent to 
54 percent, p.=0.03), but there was no movement among the information only group. 
On the sale of state assets all three groups started off in broadly similar places (49, 
53 and 50 percent opposed), but after the treatments on the deliberative group saw 
any significant change. 91 percent opposed after the treatment compared to 49 and 
46 for the other two groups. This is despite the fact that the information-only control 
group received the same information from the same experts as the deliberative 
group. A similar pattern continues on the other questions; on the reintroduction of 
students‟ fees, though starting with broadly similar views, the deliberating group 
shifted opinion significantly. 
How Ireland should react to the economic crisis was asked in more general terms as 
well: whether the country should concentrate on increasing taxes or cutting spending 
to address the fiscal deficit. Initially 66 percent of the deliberation group supported 
cutting spending, similar to the 61 and 63 percent in the information-only and control 
groups. The group subjected to deliberation increased its support for cutting 
spending to 74 percent (p. =0.0364). The other two groups support for cutting 
spending also rose but by less, to 66 and 68 percent respectively. One of the 
claimed advantages of deliberation is that subjects have more consistent or more 
realistic attitudes to the choices facing policy makers. We often see ordinary people 
are opposed to cutting spending but equally opposed to raising taxes. If deliberation 
does make people‟s views more consistent we should see that those who are more 
opposed to cutting spending should be more in favour of increasing taxes. The three 
groups opposed increasing taxes: 64, 61 and 69 percent respectively. After 
deliberation this fell significantly among the deliberation group (to 49 percent, p. = 
0.0075) but remained stable with the other two groups. So yes, the group subject to 
deliberation is more likely to move to a more consistent position.  
These results strongly indicate that deliberation is more important in opinion change 
than just information. However this may not be necessarily the case. Deliberation 
within a group, we would expect would have the same effect on individuals in the 
group, whereas information might have differing effects on different people. The 
positions of the other people in the group will be important. One thing we might be 
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seeing is that the deliberative group‟s opinion change happened in the same 
direction whereas the information-only group‟s opinion shifted in a non-uniform way. 
Then we should look at the absolute (rather than the net) level of change. 
In the eight questions which dealt with topics covered by the information provided to 
both the deliberation and information-only groups, in seven of these the absolute 
level of change was higher in the deliberation group than the information group. 
However in only two cases was the absolute level of opinion change statistically 
significantly higher. These were in the more specific questions on the stale of state 
assets and reintroduction of third-level student fees, both subjects on which the two 
advocates agreed. So change is, at very least, just as likely as a result of 
deliberation. 
Increased consensus: This analysis assumes that opinion movement is a 
normatively „good‟ thing. Does opinion movement really mean an improvement? One 
other way in which we might think about the impact of deliberation is that it provides 
an understanding of the public in public opinion. Opinions formed as the result of 
deliberation are more like public opinions than just an aggregate of private opinions. 
We would expect if deliberation is good at „public‟ opinion formation then there 
should be increased consensus as a result of deliberation.  
In order to establish if there was increased cohesion within the groups, we can 
simply look at the change in level of spread. In the eight questions where we can 
meaningfully compare the groups, i.e. where there was information on the topics, in 
six of the eight questions presented the spread of opinions is reduced for the 
deliberation group. This compares with three out of eight for the information only and 
the control group. So we seem to see a trend to greater agreement. But is this trend 
statistically significant? By taking the ratio of the two standard deviations we can see 
that in general there is no statistically significant reduction in the spread of opinions, 
except on two questions. These are the questions on the introduction of water 
charges and the sale of state assets. Here the F-statistic was 1.9 (p=0.0009) and 
2.67 (p<0.0001). In the two other groups none of the changes in spread were 
statistically significant. Generally there does not seem to be extensive moves to an 
agreed opinion, but these are somewhat more likely among the group that deliberate 
compared to other groups. 
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Conclusion 
We often think of people‟s opinions as determined by information and predispositions 
or stereotypes. So old fashioned media which imparted information was often 
thought to have a major impact on people‟s opinions. This was rejected by a good 
deal of research, but Zaller (1996) claims that this research underestimated the 
impact of political campaigns. But we do not know to what extent the campaign 
matters because of the information it generated or because of the conversation it 
sparked. But the research reported here indicates that information may be much less 
important than we might think and that it is the feedback loop of information and the 
interpretation of events that makes deliberation and hence the context in which 
people are making decisions. 
The paper also has something to say on the question of whether deliberation works. 
Here it seems to provide strong evidence that deliberation, rather than information is 
the cause of the opinion change seen in many empirical studies of deliberative 
settings. Whether this is necessarily a positive result for deliberative theorists might 
be open to question. Hirchman (1989) noted that „[v]acillation, indifference, or weakly 
held opinions have long met with utmost contempt, while approval and admiration 
have been bestowed on ﬁrmness, fullness, and articulation of opinion.‟ Perhaps 
people think it a „good‟ to have opinions, and not having an opinion is more difficult in 
a public deliberative setting. That said there seems little to debate as to whether 
deliberation matters. 
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